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Emergentism is the view that there are certain real-world entities necessarily generated 
from and constituted by other entities but not fully reducible to them ontologically and/or 
epistemically. Emergence is thus a relation in which an entity (the ‘emergent’) is partially 
dependent on and partially independent of the entities with respect to which it is said to 
be emergent (the ‘emergence base’). The emergence bases provide the necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for the emergents’ existence or identity. Ontological emergence 
occurs when some real-world entity, such as an object, process, property, causal power 
or law is not fully (pre)determined or generated by its respective base entities. 
Epistemological emergence occurs when some real-world entity cannot be represented, 
predicted from or explained by concepts, theories, law-statements or models referring to 
its respective base entities. The emergence relation can be further conceived 
diachronically, as a process, and synchronically, as a distinctive ontic status. In the first 
case, emergence refers to the relation between a newly formed entity and its original 
emergence base, or to the relative independence of certain macro-properties of a system 
relative to many changes in its parts’ properties. In the second case, emergence refers to 
the emergent status of a system in virtue of its qualitative difference and relative causal 
autonomy, at any time of its development, vis-à-vis the properties and causal profiles of 
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its contemporary parts. Finally, some emergentists also claim that ontologically emergent 
systems causally affect, constrain, control or condition their own parts’ identities or 
behaviors. 
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